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"Fresh Start" or "Head Start": Missouri

Courts Rethink the Role of Tenancies by
the Entirety in Bankruptcy
LandmarkBank v. Charles (In re Charles)1
Few issues have caused as much consternation2 in determining the extent
of a debtor's estate in bankruptcy3 as the treatment to be given property held
by the debtor as a tenant by the entirety.4 The Bankruptcy Court for the

1. 123 Bankr. 52 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991).
2. See, e.g., Ackerly, Tenants by the Entirety Propertyand the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701 (1980); Craig, An Analysis of Estates by the
Entirety in Bankruptcy, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 255 (1974); Kalevitch, Some Thoughts on
Entireties in Bankruptcy, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 141 (1986); Note, Administration of
Entireties Property in Bankruptcy, 60 IND. L.J. 305 (1985) [hereinafter Note,
Administration ofEntireties];Note, The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and Its Effect Upon
Tenancies by the Entireties,13 IND. L.REv. 761 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Bankruptcy
Code]; Note, Estates By the Entireties in Bankruptcy, 15 J. L. REF. 399 (1982);
Comment, EntiretiesProperty: The Effects of Bankruptcy on Creditors' Rights, 28 U.
Pr. L. REV. 267 (1966) [hereinafter Comment, Entireties Property].
3. The debtor's estate in bankruptcy is the device used "to bring all of the
debtor's nonexempt property together and, through an orderly administration of the
assets, to pay as much as possible ratably among the creditors of the same class."
Craig, supra note 2, at 262.
4. The term "tenancy by the entirety" describes a peculiar kind of co-ownership
between a husband and a wife. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCrON TO THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 229 (1962). As with a joint tenancy, the estate is created through th6 four
unities of time, title, interest, and possession. Id. When these unities exist in a
husband and wife, absent a clearly expressed contrary intention, a tenancy by the
entirety is created. Ronollo v. Jacobs, 775 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Mo. 1989). In Missouri,
personal property, as well as real property, may be held in tenancy by the entirety. In
re Estate of King, 572 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). This entirety estate is
founded on the common law concept of legal unity of the spouses. R. CUNNINGHAM,
W. STOEBUCK, D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 210-11 (1987) [hereinafter
Thus, it adds a "fifth unity": unity of person. 4 G. THOMPSON,
CUNNINGHAM].
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 64 (repl. ed. 1981)
Although changing attitudes, exemplified by the Married Women's Property Acts, have
nearly abandoned this hoary old concept, its spin-off fiction, tenancy by the entirety,
is "alive and well in Missouri" and in many other states. CUNNINGHAM, supra note
4, at 211; Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 647-50 (Mo. 1986) (abolishing
interspousal tort immunity flowing from archaic "unity fiction... [which] our General
Assembly attempted to abrogate"); Skinner v. Checkett, No. 88-5144-CV-SW-8 (W.D.
Mo. Jan. 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 11

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

Eastern District of Missouri, in Landmark Bank v. Charles (In re Charles),5

held that where a debtor owns property as a tenant by the entirety, and that
debtor files bankruptcy singly while seeking relief from debts owed jointly
with the non-filing spouse, that property becomes a part of that debtor's
bankruptcy estate. 6 The trustee must administer this property only for the
benefit of the joint creditors, and the debtor may exempt the remainder from
distribution to his sole creditors.7

A comprehensive study of all the facets of tenancies by the entirety is beyond the
scope of this Note. In addition to the authorities cited above, good overviews are
provided in H. Grilliot & T. Yocum, Tenancy by the Entirety: An Ancient Fiction
FrustratesModern Creditors, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 341, 341-46 (1979), and Phipps,
Tenancy by Entireties,25 TEMP. L.Q. 24, 24-43 (1952).
For the purposes of this Note, there are three unique characteristics to a tenancy
by the entirety which lie at the core of this bankruptcy controversy. First, the two
spouses are said to hold the estate per tout et non per my, i.e. by the whole and not
by the part. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 4, at 229. A Missouri court stated that "neither
-spouse owns an undivided half interest in entirety property; the whole entirety estate
is vested and held in each spouse and the whole continues in the survivor." Ronollo,
775 S.W.2d at 123. The second critical characteristic is that neither spouse, acting
alone, may transfer any portion of the estate during the joint lives of the spouses.
Kennedy v. Miles, 773 S.W.2d 519, 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). The final relevant
aspect of tenancies by the entirety is that neither spouse, acting alone, may encumber
the entirety property, Manissi v. Manissi, 672 S.W.2d 738, 739-40 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984), nor may any individual creditor of one spouse lien, levy, execute or in any way
affect the entirety property without the express or implied acquiescence of the other
spouse. United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326, 330 (8th Cir. 1951) (construing
this characteristic as "an essential element" of Missouri law). A joint creditor of both
spouses, however, may execute on entirety property. Dickey v. Thompson, 323 Mo.
107, 120, 18 S.W.2d 388, 393 (Mo. 1929).
Tenancies by the entirety are recognized, in some form, in at least twenty
jurisdictions, CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 211; Note, Administration of Entireties,
supra note 2, at 309-10 n.24, with one author placing the number as high as
twenty-six. Note, Estates by the Entiretiesin Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 402. This
Note, concerns only those jurisdictions who have, like Missouri, retained all three of
the strict common law characteristics of tenancies by the entirety set out above. These
jurisdictions number approximately twelve, Craig, supra note 2, at 295-302, to
fourteen. Note, Administration ofEntireties,supra note 2, at 331-32, 336-37. In the
other jurisdictions, at least one spouse has a conveyable, leviable interest. Craig, supra
note 2, at 295-302.
5. 123 Bankr. 52 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991).
6. Id. at 55.
7. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/11
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This result puts the Eastern District of Missouri in accord with the
majority of jurisdictions, 8 and represents a significant change from previous
practice in Missouri. 9

The decision (i) dramatically alters the rights of

debtors and creditors in this very common situation, 0 (ii) abandons a
strained interpretation perpetuated by other Missouri courts," and (iii) raises
several new and complex questions.' 2
To place In re Charles in its proper perspective, this Note traces the
Missouri and national treatment of tenancies by the entirety under bankruptcy
law. This history began with the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.13 A settled
procedure under the 1898 Act was reconsidered when Congress adopted the
1978 Code.' 4 A consensus on the treatment of tenancies by the entirety
under the 1978 Code has only now emerged.' s As the courts apply this new
uniform approach, focus has shifted to the inconsistencies created by this
procedure. 16 This Note will illustrate that In re Charles is but one step along
this road for Missouri courts.

8. See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 69-95 and accompanying text.
10. The facts in In re Charles were presented to the court by stipulation of the
parties. Charles, 123 Bankr. at 53. The debtor, Mr. Cecil Charles, held funds in a
Landmark Bank account as a tenant by the entirety with his wife, Julie Charles. Id.
at 52. Control of these funds was given to the trustee by Landmark Bank after Mr.
Charles filed bankruptcy. Id. Mr. and Mrs. Charles demanded the funds be returned,
contending that as entirety property, they constituted no part of the bankruptcy estate.
Id. Although not specifically stated, it can be reasonably inferred from the opinion
that at the time Mr. Charles filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy, he and his wife had joint

and unsecured debts. Id. at 55.
These key facts: (1) the joint, unsecured, debts of a husband and wife, (2)
the property held by the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, and (3) the one
spouse filing bankruptcy while the other does not, produce the most difficult issues for
a bankruptcy court in determining the extent of a bankrupt's estate. These fact
situations also form the scope of this Note. Unless otherwise stated, it may be
assumed that each of these elements was present in each of the cases cited herein.
11. See infra notes 69-95 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 136-160 and accompanying text.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 101 to -1130 (1976) (repealed 1978) [hereinafter 1898 Act]. See
infra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 101 to -1130 (1988) [hereinafter 1978 Code]. See infra notes 3753 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 136-160 and accompanying text.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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I. TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRETY UNDER THE 1898 Acr
Section 70a(5) of the 1898 Act provided that upon the debtor's filing of
a petition in bankruptcy, the trustee in bankruptcy would take title to all

"property, including any rights of action, which prior to the filing of the
petition [the debtor] could by any means have transferred or which might have

been levied upon and sold under judicial process."'" To determine which
property satisfied these requirements, bankruptcy courts looked to the state law
where the property was located. 8
In virtually all cases where one spouse filed for bankruptcy and the other
spouse did not, no part of the tenancy by the entirety property passed to the
trustee or was subject to the bankruptcy proceeding.' 9 This resulted because
the debtor held no interest in the property that could20 be transferred or levied
upon by creditors by the debtor acting individually.
Even though the entirety property was not brought into the estate, the
debtor could still be discharged from all debts, including joint debts.2' This
led virtually all courts to acknowledge the resulting inequitable position of

17. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970) (repealed 1978).
18. In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544, 546 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub non.
Wetteroff v. Grand, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
19. Blodgett v. United States, 161 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1947).
20. See supra note 4. Where both spouses filed bankruptcy at the same time,
courts have consolidated the two proceedings to satisfy joint creditors, reasoning that
if both spouses have filed, then the whole of the entirety property must be vested in
the trustee. Wetteroff, 453 F.2d at 546; contra Shipman v. Fitzpatrick, 350 Mo. 118,
120-21, 164 S.W.2d 912, 913 (Mo. 1942). Although it appears that since neither
spouse had a transferable/leviable interest, neither spouse passed any part of the
entirety property to the trustee. Thus the trustee's aggregate title would be two times
nothing. Courts have not discussed this anomaly. Cf.Kalevitch, supra note 2, at 146
(noting that the same anomaly continues under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code).
Courts were split as to whether, once brought into the estate by virtue of both
spouses having filed bankruptcy, the entirety property could be sold for the benefit of
all creditors or only the couple's joint creditors. See Craig, supra note 2, at 267-72;
Ackerly, supra note 2, at 706. This split arises from the following catch-22: if an
individual creditor is allowed to benefit from the entirety property now within the
estate, that creditor is in a better position with respect to the debtor than would be the
case outside of bankruptcy; if an individual creditor is not allowed to benefit, this
would violate "an avowed aim of the Bankruptcy Act: to equalize distribution among
creditors." Comment, EntiretiesProperty,supra note 2, at 283-84. For a discussion
of the reoccurrence of this dilemma under the new Code, see infra notes 79-84 and
accompanying text.
21. Wharton v. Citizen's Bank of Bosworth, 223 Mo. App. 236, 240-41, 15
S.W.2d 860, 862 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929); see also Comment, EntiretiesProperty,supra

note 2, at 285-90.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/11
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joint creditors in this situation. One author summarized the problem as
follows: (1) the debtor is discharged from his joint debts in bankruptcy, (2) the
joint creditor must gain a judgment over both spouses before the tenancy by
the entirety property is available for execution, (3) the debtor's discharge
prevents the joint creditors from ever achieving this status, and thus, ever
executing on the tenancy by the entirety property, and (4) therefore, the
creditor is left only able to gain an individual judgment against, and execute
on the individual assets of, the spouse who was not discharged in bankruptcy;
a substantially worse position than the creditor initially bargained for.22
Rensenhouse ElectricalSupply Co. v. Magee (In reMagee),' a Missouri

bankruptcy court decision under the 1898 act, typifies the majority approach
when faced with this potential for "legal fraud." 24 To deny the creditors an
equitable remedy, "would not merely give a bankrupt spouse, owning property
by the entirety with a non-bankrupt spouse, a 'fresh start', it would give him
a 'head start' which the Act does not contemplate. "2 5 Therefore, the court
stayed the debtor's discharge and gave the joint creditor leave to pursue the
claim against the debtor in state court. In the state court, the creditor would
seek a joint judgment for execution against the tenancy by the entirety
property to which the creditor had been denied access in bankruptcy court.7
This remedy of lifting the automatic stay from a joint creditor resulted in
large part from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Phillips v. Krakower.27

In Krakower, the court stated the

following:
It is elementary that a bankrupt is not entitled to a discharge unless and
until he surrendered his assets for the benefit of creditors; and he certainly
is not in position to ask a court of bankruptcy, which is a court of equity,
to grant him a discharge under the statute, when the effect of the discharge

22. Craig, supra note 2, at 284 (citing Shipman v. Fitzpatrick, 350 Mo. 118, 164
S.W.2d 912 (Mo. 1942)), see also Comment, Entireties Property, supra note 2, at

285-90.
23. 415 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (affirming the bankruptcy court, whose
opinion is attached to the district court's opinion as an appendix).
24. Id. at 527 (quoting Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, 765-66 (4th Cir.

1931)). The legal fraud in such cases is "the effectual withholding of the property
from the reach of those entitled to subject it to their claims, for the beneficial
ownership and possession of those who created the claims against it. We cannot
conceive that any court would lend its aid to the accomplishment of a result so
shocking to the conscience." Krakower, 46 F.2d at 765-66.

25." Magee, 415 F. Supp. at 528.
26. Id. at 530.
Krakower,
46 F.2dSchool
at 765-66.
Published 27.
by University
of Missouri
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will be to withdraw from the reach of creditors property properly applicable
to the satisfaction of the their claims. 28
The Krakower court found support for its decision in Lockwood v. Exchange
Bank.29 In that case the United States Supreme Court noted that in a case
where a creditor held waivers executed by the debtor, "certainly, there would

exist in favor of a creditor

. . .

an equity entitling him to a reasonable

postponement of the discharge of the bankrupt, in order to allow the institution
in the state court of such proceedings30 as might be necessary to make effective
the rights possessed by the creditor."
Thus, in states recognizing the common law formulation of tenancies by
the entirety, 3 ' courts found one hand bound in the treatment of these
properties by the language of the statute, but were free with the other hand to
fashion a remedy at equity to protect the rights of the joint creditors.

II. TENANCIES BY THE ENnRETY UNDER THE 1978 CODE
Most courts addressing the issue of tenancies by the entirety under the
1978 Code approach the question in two parts: (1) Are tenancy by the entirety
properties now part of the debtor's estate under section 541(a);3' and (2) If
-made a part of the estate, can these interests be exempted from administration
under section 522(b)(2)(B)? 33 Because each of these questions has proved
dispositive to at least one court, this Note will deal with them separately.

28. Id.
29. 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
30. Id. at 300.
31. See supra note 4.
32. Section 541(A) of the 1978 Code reads, in pertinent part: "The commencement of a case under.., this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all
the following property, wherever located and by whomever held: (1)... all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11
-U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
33. Section 522(b) of the 1978 Code reads, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt
from property of the estate ...
(2)(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of the case, an interest as a
tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such
interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from

process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/11
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A minority of courts has concluded that tenancy by the entirety properties
still are not included in the bankruptcy estate under section 541(a).' Other
minority decisions concluded that a debtor's interest is part of the estate, but
is exempt from the reach of all creditors. 35 The majority of courts, however,
have determined that the debtor's interest in the entirety property passes to the
trustee and can satisfy the claims of joint creditorsO6
A. Does a debtor's interest in tenancy by the entirety property

become part of the bankruptcy estate?
The initial determination of the extent of the debtor's estate is made
under section 541(a) of the 1978 Code.37 Section 541 calls for the creation
of an estate, administered by the trustee, encompassing "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property."38 The legislative history reveals that this
section should be interpreted broadly, bringing all of the debtor's assets into
the estate, and leaving any questions of exemption for a later decision under
section 522.39 Congress, however, did not expressly state how tenancies by
the entirety should be treated. 40 The House Judiciary Committee stated that

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
Id.
39. S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-84, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787,5868; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36768 reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6322-24.

The

Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives stated that the bankrupt's estate
consists of:
[A]I interests, such as interests in real or personal property that the debtor
has... whether or not transferable by the debtor .... Certain restrictions
on the transferability of property will prevent the trustee from realizing on
some items of property ....[B]ut on the whole, the trustee will be able to
bring all property together for a coherent evaluation of its value and
transferability, and then to dispose of it for the benefit of the debtor's
creditors.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 176-77, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6136-37.
40. A clear expression was made, however, by the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States, which was created by Congress in 1970 to study the current
laws and recommend changes. The Commission reported to the Congress:
Under the proposed Act, the undivided interest of a spouse who is a debtor
in a case under the Act is property of the estate. This is contrary to the
present Act which looks to state law to determine what happens with
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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. the bill does not

invalidate the rights, but provides a method by which the estate may realize
interest in the property while protecting the [nonon the value of the debtor's
41
filing spouse's] rights.",
Commentators have reasoned that this language, and the Code sections
dealing specifically with the exemption42 or sale43 of tenancy by the entirety
property, indicate congressional intent to make this property part of the
bankrupt's estate and, hence, subject to the trustee's administration. 44
Another argument showing that section 541 should include tenancies by
the entirety property is the significant departur the section represents from the
practice under section 70(a) of the 1898 Act, the predecessor of code
section 541. 45 The 1898 Act defined the estate as interests that the debtor
could transfer or subject to liens of individual creditors. 46 The United States
Supreme Court47 said that "the title to the property of a bankrupt, generally

exempted by state laws, should remain in the bankrupt, and not pass to [the
When Congress repealed the 1898 Act, it expressly stated that
trustee]."
the new section 541 overruled this case.49

Congress intended section 541 to have a broad reach.50 The method
used by Congress to effectuate this broad scope was to change the "transfer-

respect to property jointly owned by a husband and wife.
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. L.C. 1, at 194 (1973).
41. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 177, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
& ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6137.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1988).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (1988).

CONG.

44. Note, Administration of Entireties,supra note 2, at 313; Note, Bankruptcy

Code, supra note 2, at 765-66. This analysis has been criticized on the grounds that
it is "bootstrapping;" in essence, basing the existence of an interest of the debtor in the
entirety property, which is required under section 541, on Code sections that do not
apply until after the property is deemed in the estate under section 541. Note,
Bankruptcy Code, supra note 2, at 766.
45. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1974) (repealed 1978).

46. Id.

47. Lockwood v. Exchange Bank of Fort Valley, 190 U.S. 294 (1903) (bankruptcy
court had no jurisdiction over homestead property subject to state law exemption
regardless of whether debtor had waived his homestead rights). Section 70a of the
1898 Act stated that the Trustee would not take title to property determined to be
exempt. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1974) (repealed 1978).
48. Id. at 299.
49. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 368, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEws 5963, 6324 (overruling Lockwood because the estate
includes "all property of the debtor, even that needed for a fresh start").
50. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/11
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ability/leviability" test under the 1898 Act 1 to the "interest" test in Section
541.52 As a result, it is reasonable to infer that Congress expected that
property owned in a tenancy by the entirety, while not transferable by either
spouse acting individually, is nonetheless an interest and will be made part of
the estate.5
In 1981, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Greenblatt v. Ford
became the first court of appeals to unravel the status of tenancies by the
entirety in bankruptcy under the 1978 Code. 4 Adopting the bankruptcy
court's en banc opinion, the court of appeals declared that under Maryland
law, a debtor's undivided interest in entirety property is part of the bankruptcy
estate pursuant to section 541." The bankruptcy court began its examination

of section 541 by stating that the determination of whether a debtor's interest
in entirety property is a "legal or equitable interest" (and therefore within the
bankruptcy estate) is a federal question.56 Because neither the code nor any
other federal law defines "property" or "an interest in property," the court then
turned to state law to resolve the issue.57 The court found that, under
Maryland law, the debtor has "an in futuro expectancy" and "an undivided,
indivisible present right to the use, possession and income from his tenants by
the entireties property."58 The court concluded that "[t]hese [rights are] in
esse legal and equitable interests of the debtor."5 9 The court then held that,
based on legislative history, the "clear congressional intent [was] ... that the

51. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 69-95 and accompanying text.
53. One commentator attempts to rebut this argument by stating that, under the
1898 Act, entirety properties were not exempt, but rather immune. Note, The
Bankruptcy Code, supra note 2, at 773-75. This was because the protection afforded
entirety came, not from explicit state statutory exemptions, but "'from the peculiar
nature of the estate."' Id. at 773-74 (quoting Shaw v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 245,
246 (V.D. Mich. 1939)). Therefore, the author argues, unless states were now to
specifically exempt entirety properties, their status would continue as immune, rather
than exempt, rendering section 522(b)(2)(B) a nullity. Id.
It is, however, not certain that Congress had this particular subtlety of state
property law in mind when it drafted section 522(b)(2)(B). In contrast to the argument
above, it is equally possible that Congress' use of the word "exempt" in section
522(b)(2)(B) indicates a misunderstanding of the classification of entireties under the
1898 Act.
54. 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1981), affig on the opinion, In re Ford, 3 Bankr. 559
(Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (applying Maryland law).
55. Greenblatt,638 F.2d at 14.
56. Ford,3 Bankr. at 564-65.
57. Id. at 565.
58. Id. at 566.
59. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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debtor's undivided interest in tenants by the entireties property is property of
the estate."'
The same result was reached by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals without reference to state law.61 Every other court of appeals facing
the issue has held that section 541 brings a debtor's interest in property as a
tenant by the entirety into the bankruptcy estate. 62
The majority of lower court decisions also hold that section 541 brings
the debtor's interests in entirety property into the bankruptcy estate.63 The
courts' decisions, however, are not unanimous. In In re Jeffers,64 the court
finds the legislative history inconclusive.6 Concentrating on the language
of the House Committee Report indicating that section 541 did not invalidate

60. Id. at 570. The Ford opinion by Judge Goldbum and Judge Lebowitz is an
exhaustive look at the wealth of legislative history that surrounds the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978. Id. at 566-70. This section of the opinion will be of great use
to anyone engaged in the task of analyzing the intent of Congress, regardless of the
particular statute under study. This opinion forms the basis of section I of this Note.
61. Napotnik v. Equibank and Parkvale Say. Ass'n, 679 F.2d 316, 318 (3d Cir.
1982).
62. Community Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of New York v. Persky (In re Persky),
893 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989) (by necessary implication because the case turned on
whether the trustee could order a sale of the property under section 363(h)); Liberty
State Bank and Trust v. Grosslight (In re Grosslight), 757 F.2d 773, 775 (6th Cir.
1985) (without reference to state law); Chippenham Hosp., Inc. v. Bondurant (In re

Bondurant), 716 F.2d 1057,1058 (4th Cir. 1983) (although the case concerned Virginia
property, the court determines the property to be within the estate without reference
to state law).
63. See, e.g., Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Martin (In re Martin), 20 Bankr. 374, 376
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Chrystler (In re Trickett), 14 Bankr.
85, 89 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981); In re Barsotti, 7 Bankr. 205, 210 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1980).
Interestingly, the court in Barsotti stated the following:
even if it were argued that entireties property was not includable under
§ 541(a)(1), § 541(a)(2) includes in the debtor's estate all interests of the
debtor and the debtor's spouse in community property . . . (A) under the
sole, equal or joint management and control of the debtor." Since husband
and wife manage and control tenancy by the entireties property as a "sole"
natural person, it is clear that entireties property is included as property of
the debtor's estate.
Barsotti, 705 Bankr. at 210 (citations omitted).
Section 541(a)(2) was also considered by the court in Ford as a grounds for
including the debtor's entirety interest. The Ford court dismissed this section as an
independent provision for including entirety property, saying that it "is merely a further
clarification of the broad scope of § 541(a)(1)." Ford, 3 Bankr. at 569.
64. 3 Bankr. 49 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1980).
65. Id. at 56.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/11
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tenancy by the entirety rights,6 the court held that, while Congress certainly
had the constitutional power to alter state property rights in pursuit of
"uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States," 67
the language and history of section 541 are insufficient to warrant a change
in state entirety law.68
In Missouri, before the instant case, bankruptcy courts had consistently
held that a debtor's interest in entirety property was not included in the
bankruptcy estate. The first case to do so was Miner v. Anderson (In re
Anderson).69 Noting that another court looked to state law to determine
whether section 541 included a debtor's interests in entirety property, ° the
Anderson court looked to Missouri entirety law to determine whether the
debtor had a legal or equitable interest in the property. 7' The Anderson court
distinguished other decisions by determining that "[u]nlike the Maryland
version of tenancy by the entirety, the Missouri version has no right of
survivorship as such." 72 Therefore, the court found that the debtor, as an
individual, had no right to the use, enjoyment, or income from the property.

These rights vest in the "entiretyship;" in essence, the "legal unity of husband
and wife." 73 Because the estate is "'not held by the moieties or halves, but
both tenants hold and own the entire estate as a single person,"' the court
found it "signally clear" that the debtor had no legal or equitable interest, and
thus no part of the tenancy by the entirety property could become part of the
estate. 74 The Anderson court disregarded the legislative history discussed in
other opinions, and focused on the permissive language found in the House

66. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
68. Jeffers, 3 Bankr. at 57.
69. 12 Bankr. 483, 490 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981).
70. In re Koehler, 6 Bankr. 203 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that Florida law
permits including debtor's entirety interests in the bankruptcy estate). The court in
Anderson does not refer to the striking similarities between Florida and Missouri
entirety law. See, e.g., Sharp v. Hamilton, 520 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1988) (entirety properties
are immune from process of either spouse, but not creditors of both spouses); United
States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Hiles, 670 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (same);
see also Note, Administration ofEntireties,supra note 2, at 331-32, 337 (characterizing Florida and Missouri law as substantially identical in all relevant respects). The
Court in Anderson also does not offer any explanation as to why they reached exactly
the opposite conclusion as the court in Koehler.
71. Anderson, 12 Bankr. at 488-91.
72. Id. at 489.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Leuzinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 396 S.W.2d
570, 580 (Mo. 1965) (en banc) (court's emphasis)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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Committee Report75 to support its finding that section 541 does not change
the treatment of tenancies by the entirety in bankruptcy in Missouri.7 6 The
court noted that its conclusion perpetuated "the unsatisfactory situation which
existed under the old Bankruptcy Act,"" but that the result reached was
"exactingly compelled." 78
Bankruptcy courts in Missouri continued the approach adopted in
Anderson until 1987 when the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Missouri decided the case of In re Townsend.79 Finding that "Missouri had
demonstrated its willingness to abandon the aged and outmoded fiction that
husband and wife are under all circumstances, one person in the law," the
court concluded that it would no longer "trap the joint creditors of such a
union in an ancient time warp for bankruptcy purposes in bankruptcy

75. Section 541 "provides a method by which the estate may realize on the value
of the debtor's interest in the property while protecting the [non-filing spouse's]
rights." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 177, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6137.
The Anderson court believed that the use of the word "may," "necessarily mean[t]
that, in states like Missouri, where the entiretyship gives the debtor, standing alone,
no legal or equitable right, the entirety property cannot be deemed to have passed into
the estate in bankruptcy." Anderson, 12 Bankr. at 490. One commentator labeled the
Anderson court's construction of the permissive language in the legislative history as
"unnecessary." Note, Administration ofEntireties,supra note 2, at 312 n.34. Given
the context of the statement and the phrases following it, a more natural interpretation
is for "may" to refer to the possibility of a sale by the trustee in those cases where the
criteria of Section 363(h) can be satisfied. Id.
76. Anderson, 12 Bankr. at 490.
77. The court was aware that by forcing the joint creditors to pursue the type of
remedy described in In reMagee, see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text, a race
would ensue. Anderson, 12 Bankr. at 490. The creditor who was Ible to get the stay
lifted first would likely be the first to obtain judgment and writ of execution in the
state court and "thus, in all likelihood ....obtain the property held in the tenancy by
the entirety to the exclusion of the other [joint] creditors." Id. The court held that,
while a pro rata distribution under the rules of bankruptcy administration was a more
desirable outcome, it was not possible under the current statute. Id. at 490-91. The
court reconciled itself to the less than desirable outcome saying, "[T]he court cannot
be wiser than the law." Id. at 491.
78. Anderson, 12 Bankr. at 490-91.
79. 72 Bankr. 960 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/11

12

Wilson: Wilson:Fresh Start or Head Start

1991]

TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRETY

estates."8
Thus, Townsend states that section 541 requires a Missouri
debtor's interest in entirety property to be included in the bankruptcy estate. 1
By reaching this conclusion, the court in In re Townsend avoided the
recurrence of the "unsatisfactory situation" from which the Anderson court had
not been able to extricate itself.82 In re Townsend stated that a more
logically consistent and procedurally efficient position is advanced if the
bankruptcy estate administers entirety properties.8 3 The Townsend court also
noted, as did the Anderson court, that the stay-lifting procedure often results
in a race among joint creditors to gain an unfair advantage while "each joint
creditor . . . incur[s] duplicative expenses in its separate motions and state
court actions."'

In addition, the court in In re Townsend raised three arguments that call
into question the continued validity of the stay-lifting procedure under the
1978 Code.8 First, the court found that if the debtor's interest is subsequently exempted under section 522, "then most pre-petition judicial liens on
that property would impair that exemption and are thus avoidable under
Section 522(f)(1)." 86 Additionally, the court warned that a debtor might

80. Id. at 963. The "willingness" to which the court referred was illustrated solely
by the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646
(Mo. 1986) (en banc). The Townsend bankruptcy court noted the following:
In the Townsend case, the Supreme Court of Missouri, sitting en banc, did
away with the doctrine of unity of husband and wife insofar as that doctrine
would prevent a wife from suing her husband in tort for an allegedly
intentional gunshot wound. In so doing, it did not purport to detract from
any element of tenancy by the entirety under the law of Missouri.
Townsend, 72 Bankr. at 963. Then, in a burst of judicial honesty, the court continued:
"What is stated in [our opinion] which follow[s] is stated by way of prognostication
of what the law of Missouri may be in this respect in the future, based upon the
dictum contained in the Townsend case." Id. (emphasis added). No appeal from this
decision was taken and the district court was denied a chance to comment until 1990.
81. Id. at 964-65.
82. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
83. Townsend, 72 Bankr. at 965. "[T]he delay injected into the bankruptcy case
by the lift-of-stay procedure works to the detriment of both the debtor, who is awaiting
a fresh start, and the other creditors of the estate, who await distribution of the assets."
Id. at 968. See also Rensenhause Elec. Supply Co. v. Magee (In re Magee), 415
F.Supp. 521 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
84. Townsend, 72 Bankr. at 968.
85. Id.
86. Id. Section 522(f) provides, in pertinent part:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the
fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that
such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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avoid post-petition liens under Section 522(f)(1). 87 Finally, the court
cautioned those who would use the stay-lifting procedure that Section 522(c)
requires property exempted under Section 522 will not be subject, either
during or after any bankruptcy case, to any pre-petition lien.8
The law of In re Townsend stood until the one-two punch of Garnerv.
Strauss89 and Skinner v. Checkett. ° In these two opinions, written within
eight weeks of each other, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri overruled In re Townsend, describing it as erroneously
decided, 91 an aberration, 92 and contrary to the result mandated by applicable
bankruptcy and state law. 93 After reviewing Missouri law, the court in
Garnerstated that "the inevitable conclusion... [is] that the bankrupt-debtor,
without [the non-filing spouse] has no legal or equitable interest in the
property by the entirety, and thus the property cannot be included in the
bankruptcy estate."9 4 Thus, both Garner and Skinner returned to the rule of
Andeison, holding that the debtor's interest in entirety property does not pass
to the bankruptcy estate. 5
The Missouri courts, therefore, after the Garner and Skinner cases, but
prior to In re Charles,were a distinct minority, holding that a debtor had no
interest in an entirety estate that passes to the trustee in bankruptcy.

entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is (1) a judicial lien; ....
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988).
87. Townsend, 72 Bankr. at 968. (citing Sumy v. Schlossberg (In re Sumy), 777
F.2d at 930 n.22 (4th Cir. 1985)).
88. Id.
89. 121 Bankr. 356 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990).
90. No. 88-5144-CV-SW-8 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist. file).
91. Id.
92. Garner, 121 Bankr. at 359.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 360. Interestingly, this exact language re-appears in Skinner without
citation to Garneror any other source.
95. Id.; Skinner, No. 88-5144-CV-SW-8, slip op. at 5. Both courts noted that the
shift from the "legal unity" theory of entirety properties, which the In re Townsend
court believed Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1986) (en banc)
foreshadowed, had not materialized. Garner,121 Bankr. at 360 (citing Strout Realty,
Inc. v. Henry, 758 S.W.2d 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that Townsend v.
Townsend did not extinguish unity in entireties law)); Skinner, No. 88-5144-CV-SW-8,
Slip op. at 4 (citing Ronollo v. Jacobs, 775 S.W.2d 149, 151-52 (Mo. 1989) (in
Missouri entirety property "[e]ach spouse is seized of the whole or entirety and not a
share, moiety or divisible part")).
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14

1991]

Wilson: Wilson:Fresh Start or Head Start
TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRETY

B. If a part of the estate, may a debtor exempt his interest in tenancy
by the entirety property under section 522(b)(2)(B)?

The Bankruptcy Code provides a federal scheme of exemptions available

to a debtor in bankruptcy. 96 Section 522(b) states that this list of exemptions
is available to the debtor "unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor
... does not so authorize." 97 Missouri has, along with a majority of other
states 9 ' chosen to "opt-out" of this federal exemption scheme. 99 Thus, a
debtor in Missouri must rely on the provisions of section 522(b)(2)(A)-(B) to
protect those assets needed for a "fresh start." As alluded to in Section I of
this Note, Congress has specifically provided for the treatment of property
owned as a tenant by the entirety in section 522(b)(2)(B).'0°
The legislative history of section 522(b)(2)(B) is inconclusive and
provides no clear guidance for the correct application or interpretation of this
statute.0 1 A proposed amendment, stating that tenancy by the entirety
property could be exempted "to the extent that such property or interest in
property is exempt or not subject to process or levy under [nonbankruptcy]
law... or is exempt or not subject to levy by a creditor, of only the debtor,
... under State or local law" 0 2 would have shed light on the question. This

96. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988).
97. Id. § 522(b).
98. 7 COLER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 n.6 (15th ed. 1985).
99. Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.427 (1986).

100. Section 522(b) reads, in part, as follows:
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt
from property of the estate ...

(2)(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of the case, an interest as a
tenant by the entirety or joint tenant'to the extent that such
interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from
process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
101. Note, Administration of Entireties,supra note 2, at 315, n.57.

102. 126 CONG. REC. S15,163; 126 Cong. Rec. H9,293. In Napotnik, both the
debtor and the trustee sought to use this thwarted amendment to advance their cases.
Napotnik v. Equibank & Parkvale Sav. Ass'n, 679 F.2d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 1982). The
debtor argued that this meant that the section, as it stood unamended, must be
substantively different than that proposed. Conversely, the trustee posited that the
proposed amendment was merely a clarification of an unarticulated congressional
intent. Id. The court neglected to hypothesize congressional intent based on the
negative implication of unenacted language. Id. However, the court did state that "[i]f
congress has mistakenly disguised its actual intent by incorporating language pointing
in a different direction, it is not up to us to rewrite the statute ....
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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amendment, however, was defeated for reasons unrelated to these provisions. 3
The majority of courts that have reached this issue have decided that the
debtor's interest in tenancies by the entirety is not exempt from the trustee's
administration when the debtor is liable on joint debts with the other spouse.
Proceeds from the property that are beyond what is necessary to satisfy the
joint obligations are exempt from the bankruptcy estate under section
522(b)(2)(B).
A Florida bankruptcy court was one of the earliest courts to formulate
this rule. In In re Koehler,1°4 the court stated that because joint creditors
could levy against the entirety property absent the automatic stay of
bankruptcy, this property is not "exempt from process" and is therefore not
exempt under section 522(b)(2)(B). °5
In 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed these issues
in Napotnik v. Equibank and Parkvale. Savings Association (In re
Napotnik).'" The Napotnik court determined that joint creditors have
always been able to levy on tenancy by the entirety property in Pennsylvania."° "Because the interests of both are available to the creditors of both,
the debtor's interest is not unavailable and thus is not 'exempt from process'
under the law of Pennsylvania."'0° But, because section 522(b)(2)(B) allows
an exemption only "to the extent" that Pennsylvania exempts the property, the
court held that the debtor could not claim as exempt that portion of his
entirety property needed to satisfy joint creditors." °
Until 1985, the Fourth Circuit stood alone in holding that the entire
interest of the debtor in entirety property could be exempted under section
522(b)(2)(B)." 0 The unique reasoning employed by the Fourth Circuit was
that because only the interests of the debtor in the entirety property are
brought into the estate,"' and because joint creditors cannot levy solely on
the interests of one spouse when the property is held in tenancy by the
entirety," 2 the interests of the debtor are "exempt from process" in Mary-

103. Id.
104. 6 Bankr. 203, 206 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980).
105. Id.
106. 679 F.2d 316, 318 (3d Cir. 1982).
107. Id. at 320.
108. Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 321-22. In 1985 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted
the reasoning of the Napotnik decision in Liberty State Bank & Trust v. Grosslight (In
re Grosslight), 757 F.2d 773, 776-77 (6th Cir. 1985).
110. Ford,3 Bankr. at 576.
111. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
112. Ford, 3 Bankr. at 576. "In order for the joint creditors to execute upon
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land, and thus exempt from the estate under section 522(b)(2)(B)."' This
reasoning prevailed in the Fourth Circuit until Sumy v. Schlossberg (In re
Sumy)" 4 was decided. The Sumy court first held that Ford did not control
the case because the language dealing with the presence of joint creditors was
dicta." 5 The court wrote that "because each spouse owns the whole estate
and each spouse is liable for the whole debt, it is a false distinction to declare
that a joint creditor cannot reach a spouse's individual undivided interest in
entireties property."" 6 The Sumy court also noted that the Ford reasoning
had been rejected by Napotnik, Grosslight, and a majority of bankruptcy
courts in other states with similar tenancy by the entirety law. 17 The court
then brought the Fourth Circuit in line with these courts, holding that, to the
extent there are joint creditors, the debtor's interest in the tenancy by the
entirety may not be exempted and must remain in the bankruptcy estate to
satisfy the joint creditors. 18 "[T]he guiding principle of all of our relevant
cases [is] that joint creditors are entitled, and should in some manner be
119
allowed, to reach entireties property to satisfy their claims."
The Missouri cases, holding that the debtor's interest in tenancy by the
entirety property does not become subject to the trustee's administration, 2 '
seldom reach the question of exemption. The overruled Townsend court,
because of its unique construction of Missouri law, reached this issue and was
persuaded by the majority approach as represented by Grosslight and
2

Napotnik.11

entireties property, the husband's interests must be joined with the interests of the
co-tenant wife. As a result, the debtor's interest in entireties property, standing alone,
is unavailable to the joint creditor." Id.
113. Id.
114. 777 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1985).
115. Id. at 926. Neither the facts as stated, nor the relief ultimately granted,
indicate the actual presence of joint creditors in the case. Id.
116. Id. at 928 n.13 (citing Liberty State Bank v. Grosslight (In re Grosslight),
757 F.2d 773, 776 (6th Cir. 1985)).
117. Id. at 929. The court cites extensive authority from Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Vermont, Delaware, Virginia, Michigan and Florida. Id. at 929 n.16. These states are
all considered to have tenancy by the entirety property laws that are substantially
similar to Missouri law. Note, Administration of Entireties,supra note 2, at 337.
118. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 932.
119. Id. at 926.

120. See supra note 42-59 and accompanying text.
121. Townsend, 72 Bankr. at 965.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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III. THE LANDMARK BANK V. CHARLES (IN RE CHARLES) DECISION
In January of 1991, after both Garner"' and Skinner"' had been
decided, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri addressed
for the first time"24 the issue of bankruptcy entirety property in Landmark
Bank v. Charles (In re Charles).25 In re Charles is squarely in line with
the majority of jurisdictions. The court held that funds in a bank account that
are owned as tenants by the entirety are part of the bankruptcy estate,"2 6 and
expressly declined to follow the reasoning of Anderson or Garner.2 7
Relying on an analysis of the legislative history, the court in In re Charles

122. See supra note 89.
123. See supra note 90.
124. This statement is not altogether accurate. There have been at least two prior
cases on point in the eastern district. In Kodner v. Raack (In re Kodner), 1 BAMSL
841 (1982) (Bar Association of Metropolitan St. Louis, Bankruptcy Reporter, Vol. I.),
the court held that under section 541 there is no requirement that the debtor have a
transferable interest, or even a "separate and distinct" interest. Id. at 848. Therefore,
even though a debtor in Missouri has no separate interest in tenancy by the entirety
property, "he does have certain rights and incidents of ownership which, however
small, are sufficient to include his interest in the entirety property as part of the
bankruptcy estate." Id. The question presented by the case was whether to lift the
automatic stay. As a result, the court did not reach the question of exemptibility under
section 522.
In Mann v. Carter (In re Carter), 2 BAMSL 700 (1983) (Bar Association of
Metropolitan St. Louis, Bankruptcy Reporter, Vol. II.), the court held that where only
one spouse has petitioned for bankruptcy, the entirety property escapes bankruptcy
administration either because it never comes into the estate or because, once in, it is
exempt under Section 522(b)(2)(B). Id. at 705. It should be noted that the court relied
heavily on Chippenham Hosp., Inc. v. Bondurant, 716 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1983), a
1973 case which upheld the continued vitality of the pre-Code practice of lifting the
automatic stay as a device to protect joint creditors. The Bondurant case was
followed, in 1985, by Sumy v. Schlossberg (In re Sumy), 777 F.2d 921 (4th Cir.
1985), which held that the preferred remedy is to administer such estates ih bankruptcy
rather than through non-bankruptcy means. Id. at 931-32.
This Note continues to pose In re Charles as the breakthrough case in the Eastern
District of Missouri because, interestingly, neither the Kodner nor the Mann case has
apparently ever been relied on by any subsequent decision and neither has been
subjected to the rigorous study which more publicized opinions receive.
125. 123 Bankr. 52 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991).
126. Charles, 123 Bankr. at 55.
127. Id. at 53 n.2. The court first noted that Lockwood had been expressly
overruled by the new section 541(a)(1), Id. at 53 n.1, and then based its refusal to
follow GarnerandAnderson on the fact that their approach too closely paralleled the
pre-Code analysis which Lockwood embodied. Id. at 53.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/11
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found that "[i]t is clear that the drafters of the Code contemplated that all
interests of the debtor, including those held by the entirety, would be included,
at least initially, in the estate."'28 Even though a tenant by the entirety in
Missouri may only exercise rights to the property when acting as part of the
fictional unity, "the Court finds that this ability to act represents an interest
29
cognizable -under section 541(a). 0
Despite the similarity of results, the court in In re Charles declined to
follow the reasoning of In re Townsend."' This followed from the court's
view that, regardless of the outcome of the analysis, any "state law analysis
should be conducted after the property has been brought into the estate by
31
operation of section 541(a), not before.'
Addressing the question of exemption under section 522, the court in In
re Charles employed the standard majority approach. The court noted that the
state property law in the state where the property is located is to determine the
scope of the section 522(b)(2)(B) exemption.132 This requires a review of
Missouri entireties law. 33 "[U]nder Missouri law, entireties property is not
exempt from process to the extent of joint debts.' 34 Therefore, the debtor's
funds, held as a tenant by the entirety, are not exempt from administration to
the extent of the joint debts. 35 "Any money remaining after the joint debts
of Julie and Cecil Charles are satisfied shall be subject to exemption pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B)."" 6 With this decision, Missouri bankruptcy
courts return to the majority.

128. Id. at 54 n.3 (citing Napotnik v. Equibank & Parkvale Say. Ass'n, 679 F.2d
316, 318 (3d Cir 1982)).

129. Id. at 54.
130. Id. at 54 n.3.
131. Id. (emphasis added). The court revisited the issue of timing a bankruptcy
court's analysis of state entirety law later in the opinion. Id. at 54.
It is also clear that the court in In re Charles rejected the "novel construction of
Missouri property law" put forward by the In re Townsend court. Id. at 54 n.3.
132. Id. at 54 (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)).
133. The bank account was located in Creve Coeur, Missouri. Id.
134. Id. at 54-55 (citing United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326, 330 (8th Cir.

1951) (only joint creditors of a husband and wife may execute against entirety
property); Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 170-71, 201 S.W. 67, 71
(Mo. 1918) (same)).
135. Id. at 55.
136. Id.
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NEW ISSUES ARISING OUT OF THE MAJORITY APPROACH

A. Unequal Treatment of Legally Equal Creditors
In 1981, early in the development of case law surrounding the 1978
Code, one court put forth in bold fashion:
One of the longtime principles of bankruptcy law is that all creditors of
each class shall be treated equally ....
[T]here should be orderly

administration of debtor's property without a race by creditors for
judgments and liens which give priority to the more aggressive creditors
.... Instead, this court will exercise its jurisdiction over the entireties
property and administer the entireties property for the equal benefit of all
137
joint creditors.
It is unlikely this court foresaw that the procedure it was adopting would
ultimately be challenged as violating the very principle it was thought to
further.
Under the 1898 Act, the Supreme Court of the United States formulated
what has become a guiding principle in bankruptcy administration. In Moore
v. Bay,138 the Court stated that a creditor, on whose claim the bankruptcy
trustee is able to void a transfer by the debtor, receives no special consideration.1 39 Rather, what is recovered "for the benefit of the estate is to be
distributed in 'dividends of an equal percentum' on all allowed claims, except
such as have priority or are secured." 40 Despite criticism of the opinion,
Congress expressly approved it, and the opinion continued in the context of
current Bankruptcy Code section 544(b).' 4
The doctrines of tenancies by the entirety in bankruptcy and Moore
conflicted during the late 1980's. A United States District Court in Florida
overturned a decision in which the bankruptcy court relied on Moore. The
bankruptcy court held that so long as there existed one joint creditor who
could attach the property, the tenancy by the entirety property would not be
exempt from the estate, but would be administered for the benefit of all
creditors, whether joint or sole. 42 The district court reversed this decision,

137. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Chrystler (In re Trickett), 14 Bankr. 85, 90 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1981) (citations omitted) (eschewing the stay-lifting remedy in favor of
making the debtor's interest in entirety property part of the bankruptcy estate).
138. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
139. Id. at 5.
140. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988).
142. Pepenella v. Life Insurance Co. of Georgia (In re Pepenella), 103 Bankr.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/11
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choosing instead the majority position of rendering the proceeds of tenancy
by the entirety property available only to joint creditors.'43 The court did
not address the question raised by the Moore analogy.
In In re Oberlies,'44 the bankruptcy court discussed extensively the
concerns first voiced in the Florida bankruptcy court decision. In Oberlies,
the trustee* argued that there is no statutory basis requiring the trustee to
administer two separate estates, one for joint creditors and one for sole
creditors. The trustee insisted that the rule adopted by the majority required
the trustee to do just that.' 45 This result is mandated by state property law,
which must prevail unless some overriding federal policy that takes precedence is presented. 46 The mere lack of legislation authorizing dual estates
is insufficient to indicate the existence of such an overriding policy. 47 The
trustee made a strong argument, warning that administering two estates would
eventually lead to paying unsecured, low priority, joint creditors while higher
priority sole creditors received nothing. 148 The court replied that it was only
"[b]ankruptcy administration [which] ought not effect any change in these
substantive property rights. However since joint creditors could collect from
such property, bankruptcy laws ought not dilute the substantive right by
making it subject to pro rata distribution with others who lack such rights
4
outside of bankruptcy. ,1 1
The argument that operating a dual estate, with a pool of assets entirely
for the joint creditors, violates sections 544 and 726 finally prevailed in In re
Amici. 150 Amici stated that so long as there are joint creditors, and the
criteria under section 363(h) are met,' 51 the trustee can sell the'interests of

299, 301 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988), overruling In re Pepenella, 79 Bankr. 76 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1987).
143. Id. at 302.
144. 94 Bankr. 916 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988).
145. Id. at 920.
146. Id. (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (emphasis added). In In re Geoghegan, 101 Bankr. 329 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1989), the bankruptcy court expressed discomfort with the rule laid down in
Pepenellaand Oberlies,finding it inconsistent with the Code's distribution guidelines
under section 726. Id. at 331.
150. 99 Bankr. 100 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
151. Section 363(h) reads, in pertinent part:
(h) Notwithstanding subsection (f) of this section, the trustee may sell both
the estate's interest, under subsection (b) or (c) of this section, and the
interest of any co-owner in property in which the debtor had, at the time of
the commencement of the case, an undivided interest as a tenant in
common, joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety, only if Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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both the debtor and the debtor's non-filing spouse, and use the proceeds to
satisfy all creditors and not just joint creditors." 2 The court reasoned that
the Code clearly recognizes that, under section 363(h), the trustee must, under
appropriate circumstances, be able to sell the entire tenancy by the entirety
property to preserve the rights that joint creditors enjoy outside of bankruptcy. 1
To allow the trustee to use the proceeds only for joint creditors,
however, clearly violates the distribution scheme of section 726 and the
holding in Moore.'-4 This is because it would create a sub-class of creditors
(joint unsecured creditors) who would receive more beneficial treatment from
the trustee than sole unsecured creditors, even though those creditors hold
claims of legally the same rank.15 Therefore, although the court acknowl15 6
edged the decision in In re Pepenella, it reached the opposite result.
The converse of the argument posed in Moore was presented to the
bankruptcy court in Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Chrystler (In re Tricket). 7
Sole creditors sought to invoke the equitable doctrine of marshaling to force
joint creditors to seek their satisfaction from the tenancy by the entirety
property before the general estate was distributed to all creditors.' 58 The
marshaling doctrine, however, cannot be used to circumvent a state law
exemption.15 9 As a result, the bankruptcy court held that this rationale

(1) partition in kind of such property among the estate and such
co-owners is impracticable;
(2) sale of the estate's undivided interest in such property would
realize significantly less for the estate than sale of such property
free of the interests of such co-owners;
(3) the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free of the
interests of co-owners outweighs the detriment, if any, to such
co-owners; and
(4) such property is not used in the production, transmission, or
distribution, for sale, of electric energy or of natural or synthetic
gas for heat, light, or power.
11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (1988).
152. Amici, 99 Bankr. at 103.
153. Id. at 102.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 103. The most recent effort in this struggle was written in the northern
district of Florida. There, the bankruptcy court held, employing rather awkward logic,
that the sub-class of preferred creditors about which In re Amici warned would not
exist because if they did they would violate section 726; therefore, no such class exists.
In re Boyd, 121 Bankr. 622, 623 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989).
157. 14 Bankr. 85, 91 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981).
158. Id.
159. Meyer v. United States, 375 U.S. 233 (1963).
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should also apply to tenancies by the entirety in bankruptcy.'o
The
bankruptcy court concluded that "marshaling is inappropriate and that the joint
debtors should first proceed to obtain their distribution out of the general
61
estate and then proceed against the entirety estate for the balance."
B. PracticeConsiderations
If In re Charles changes the Missouri treatment of tenancies by the
entirety when a married debtor files for bankruptcy without the other
spouse,16 2 then a new approach is required in pre-petition counseling of
debtors considering bankruptcy. Tenancy by the entirety property may no
longer be the "safe haven" it once was. Prior to In re Charles, entirety
property was beyond the reach of the bankruptcy trustee. Now, debtors retain
only the ability to prevent any of the value of these properties from benefiting
sole creditors. The debtor now faces the daunting and uncertain prospect of
having the trustee, under section 363(h), sell assets held as tenants by the
entirety to satisfy the debtor's joint creditors. This leaves the debtor and
spouse only the surplus cash. Additionally, because section 363(h) sets out
a four-part balancing test, 63 this issue will have to be litigated in every case,
driving up the legal fees of debtors and creditors alike.
The legislative history of the Code is clear that purposeful conversion of
non-exempt assets to exempt assets on the eve of bankruptcy is not fraudulent
per se.'6 Conversions are prohibited, however, when done with an actual
intent to defraud creditors. 6 One author noted a high correlation between
findings of actual intent and a significant increase in exempt assets shortly
before filing."
Missouri courts do not hesitate to set aside conveyances
that resulted in tenancies by the entirety when actual intent to defraud
creditors is shown. 67

160. Trickett, 14 Bankr. at 92.
161. Id.
162. If the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit follows each of
the other circuits in confronting these issues, then this shift may occur as a product of
the pending appeal of Garner v. Strauss, 121 Bankr. 356 (W.D. Mo. 1990), appeal
docketed, No. 90-3068WM (8th Cir. Dec. 20, 1990).
163. See supra note 150.
164. H.R. REP., supra note 39, at 6138-39.
165. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 522.08[4], at 522-33 to -34 (15th ed. 1981).
166. Estates by the Entirety in Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 401 n.16., see also
Resnick, PrudentPlanningor FraudulentTransfer? The Use ofNonexempt Assets to
Purchaseor Improve Exempt Propertyon the Eve ofBankruptcy, 31 RUTGERS L. REV.
615 (1978).
167. In re Myers, 383 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Bank of New Cambria v.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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CONCLUSION

One court, weary of sorting its way through the new 1978 Code, stated
that "[in essence, this Court faces a conundrum created by Congress' lack of
understanding of the concept of tenants by the entireties property." 16 A
commentator placed the blame on the common law concept of tenancies by
the entirety and stated that "[it is doubtful that the immunity from creditors
began as a deliberate policy end of the state; [that is] whether at any point in
time the state has consecrated a preexisting practical exemption into a
rationally designed coherent exemption plan which the federal bankruptcy law
ought to respect."' 69
Each solution fashioned by the bankruptcy courts has created additional
unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable, questions. Judge Conrad, Bankruptcy
Judge for the District of Vermont, may have stumbled upon an answer in 1990
when he stated in a footnote:
An issue which came to mind during our research on this question is
whether Section 363(h) preempts Vermont's entirety law because it
frustrates the underlying Federal bankruptcy scheme. The outcome of [the
present] matter does not require us to inquire into Section 363(h)'s
170
preemption effect, but it certainly will have to be decided another day.
Perhaps it was the lure of a unified approach, of clean crisp guidelines, that
led Judge Conrad to raise the issue of federal preemption; or perhaps it was
the wisdom of knowing that, should a court erroneously decide a statute has
preemptive effect, Congress is apt to offer more clarity on the subject the next
time around. Either way, debtors and creditors would both benefit from a
unified and predictable approach to this common issue in bankruptcy.
PAUL C. WILSON

Briggs, 361 Mo. 723, 236 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1951); Barnard v. Barnard, 568 S.W.2d
567 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
168. Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Martin (In re Martin), 20 Bankr. 374, 377 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1982).
169. Kalevitch, supra note 2, at 144 n.15.
170. In re Cerreta, 116 Bankr. 402, 404 n.3 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990) (citations
omitted).
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